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Abstract 
Artificial intelligence technologies and data structures required for training have become 
more accessible in recent years and this has enabled artists to incorporate these technologies 
into their works to various ends. This paper is concerned with the ways in which present day 
artists are engaging with artificial intelligence, specifically material practices that endeavour 
to use these technologies and their potential non-human agencies as collaborators with 
differential objectives to commercial fields. 
The intentions behind artists’ use of artificial intelligence is varied. Many works, with the 
accelerating assimilation of artificial intelligence technologies into everyday life, follow a 
critical path. Such as attempting to unveil how artificial intelligence materially works and is 
embodied, or to critically work through the potential future adoptions of artificial intelligence 
technologies into everyday life. However, I diverge from unpacking the criticality of these works 
and instead follow the suggestion of Bruno Latour to consider their composition. As for Latour, 
critique implies the capacity to discover a ‘truer’ understanding of reality, whereas 
composition addresses immanence, how things come together and the emergence of experience. 
Central to this paper are works that seek to collaborate with artificial intelligence, and to use 
it to drift out of rather than to affirm or mimic human agency. This goes beyond techniques 
such as ‘style transfer’ which is seen to support and encode existing human biases or patterns 
in data. Collaboration with signifies a recognition of a wider field of what constitutes the 
activity of artistic composition beyond being a singularly human, or AI, act, where composition 
can be situated in a system. This paper will look at how this approach allows an artist to 
consider the emerging materiality of a system which they are composing, its resistances and 
potentials, and the possibilities afforded by the exchange between human and machine 
intentions in co-composition. 
 
Die Amme / ‘The Wet Nurse’ 
Artist Peter Dittmer’s installation Die Amme (1992-2005) 1, or ‘The Wet Nurse’, invites the gallery visitor to 
engage in a real-time text-based conversation with a computational machine. Sitting down at an office-like 
workstation, visitors talk with Amme in a back and forth dialogue in a similar fashion to what we would now call 
a chat bot—a computer program that is designed to simulate, most often in language, a human-like interlocutor2. 
This conversation occurs through a classical computational interface of keyboard and screen, which alongside 
Amme’s text-based form of communication is somewhat resonant of British mathematician Alan Turing’s (1950) 
Imitation Game3.  
In the opening paragraphs of the paper in which he first introduces the imitation game, Turing deliberates on the 
question “can machines think?” (Turing 1950: 443). He suggests that this is not the question we should be asking 
as it relies upon an impossible definition of what thinking exactly is. Turing takes the reader along an alternative 
route through which to consider machine intelligences, by describing a speculative scenario where a human 
participant is asked to determine whether their unknown conversation partner, on the other side of a keyboard and 
screen, is a human or a machine. Via this conceit Turing gives the original question “can machines think” a new 
inflexion, can we instead consider the possibility of computational machines that could believably pass within 
human sociality as human (Hayles 1999; Turing 1950)? Matteo Pasquinelli states that the game “reinforces, rather 
than questions, the metacognitive assumptions behind artificial intelligence, precisely by advancing computation 
as empirical proof of thought in nonhuman entities” (2016: 6). In addition to advancing artificial intelligence (AI) 
as in some way a biomorphic replication or automation of human thought, the games complete circumvention of 
computation’s embodiment and difference sets up a normative characterisation of AI (Pasquinelli 2016). In other 
words, Turing’s proposition advances AI as “brute force imitation of human habits and conventions” (ibid: 6 
[original emphasis]) in its co-existence and relation with humankind. Although the game is not used as an actual 
test of performance in the field of AI, the biomorphic and normative notions that Pasquinelli suggests are 
implicated by the game permeate general popular discourse and contemporary AI practices4. We need to configure 
new ways in which to conceive and relate with machine intelligences, as concomitant with biomorphic and 
normative notions is a lack of regard as to the differences in how computation experiences the world, and also the 
difference its presence makes within the constitutive fabric of experience5.  
                                                                
1 It should be noted that between 1992 and 2005 Dittmer created and exhibited various iterations of Amme. In this 
paper, I address the overall work in its many iterations as Amme.  
2  Chat bots have become commonplace in contemporary computational culture, as voice-activated machine 
intelligences such as Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa, internet-based or mobile phone customer service bots, 
Twitter bots, and bots on Facebook. 
3 The imitation game is more commonly known as the Turing Test however in the paper Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence (1950) where Alan Turing first introduces the test it is referred to as the Imitation Game. Turing’s 
test was inspired by a party game where a man and a woman, hidden from the rest of the party, answer questions 
from the other guests and try to convince them that they are of the opposite sex. 
4 The pursuit of AI is often performed against a benchmark of human intelligence (One Hundred Year Study of 
Artificial Intelligence 2016). 
5 Katherine N. Hayles notes that early researchers into AI operated out of a foundation set by the “erasure of 
embodiment at the heart of the Turing Test” (Hayles 1999: xi). 
In this paper I take up Amme as an immediate historical precedent, in both its exploration of human-machine 
relations and machine expression, that speaks to the current technological developments and adoption of machine 
intelligences into social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. In a moment where computational agents, 
processes, and algorithmic decision-making, increasingly inform and are articulate within human and broader 
experience (Hansen 2015) artworks like Amme and the more recent work by Shinseungback Kimyonghun Animal 
Classifier (2016)—discussed later in this paper, can provide something of a response to urgent calls to compose 
non-biomorphic understandings of AI and ways of relating with it that do not involve the normative folding of AI 
into conventions of human relationality6.  As an alternative, I suggest that they give us a sense of human and 
machine in co-composition, placing visitors into encounters where both the human and code are implicated within, 
but not privileged, in unfolding events. Furthermore, within this implication we gain some sensibility or 
knowledge of machine intelligences, not by way of opening black boxes but by understanding how as a network 
of human and non-human entities they work as a system (Ananny and Crawford 2016: 11). 
Amme’s operation is intermeshed with a realm of human relationality, mostly via language that moves through 
human, keyboard, machine, and screen, with Amme responding in varying accordance with a visitor’s 
conversation. And yet, Dittmer’s design does not place the visitor into an encounter where they might easily and 
seamlessly relate to it as an entity with a mindset much like their own. Writing about Amme, Dittmer chronicles 
how the work commenced not as an attempt to achieve “machinic intelligence” but as an inquiry into “artificially 
generated expression” (Dittmer 2017: Chapter 2, para. 6). Dittmer seeks to retain a sense of the difference between 
human and machine expression within their exchange of language by not attempting to achieve an “omnipotent 
eloquence” on Amme’s part, and instead creating collisions between the conversationalist’s speech acts (ibid).  
In the gallery space, Amme is unequivocally present as a large-scale technical machine. Any visitor is aware that 
this entity is what they are in conference with. The machine’s form, which is mostly mundane and utilitarian in 
its presentation7, is made unfamiliar or strange through its connection to a mechanism. Behind the desk and within 
the visitor’s field of vision if they were to glance up from their conversation, is an apparatus residing in a glass 
box—a mechanism through which Amme is able to tip over a glass of milk. The event which may or may not 
happen during the conversation usually serves as a sign from Amme that the conversation has come to an end. 
However, the decision-making processes behind Amme spilling the milk operates as a “silent economy” (ibid: 
Chapter 1, para. 2) as the machine gives no indication in the structure of its interface or within its idiosyncratic 
dialogue8 as to the causal nature of its actions, both prior to and after the event has occurred. This unsettles any 
rising expectations of Amme to be like other machines, which in our relations with them are expected to perform 
in ways that are meaningful to us (Broeckmann 2016: 112), and in ways that often mimic or fit into a human-like 
                                                                
6 See Pasquinelli 2016. 
7 As mentioned in an earlier footnote Dittmer created many iterations of Amme, altering the machines physical 
form and increasing its conversational lexicon. However, over all variations, Amme retained its general 
configuration of a chair, desk, a computer station, and an apparatus that can spill a glass of milk, but the work 
grew in scale, was composed of different materials, and also was able to spill the milk in different ways. The final 
version of Amme is immense, weighs many tons and has six identical stations at which visitors can converse with 
Amme. 
8 Amme’s responses draw on a database of texts that Dittmer calls its sass reserve (Dittmer 2017). The artist has 
gradually expanded this reserve over the years of Amme’s development by using material from the history of its 
dialogue with visitors.  
pattern of relation. Whilst engaging with Amme, a visitor’s capacity to imagine the thinking process of the machine 
as being like their own, as a means to predict its future actions, is disturbed as the machine’s silent process of 
decision-making is not coherent with their own. 
Computation operates within experience at varying levels of sensibility and the actualities of most computational 
processes are phenomenally imperceptible or ephemeral as they do not possess a “perceptual correlate” (Hansen 
2015: 4) that operates on a human sensory level. It is only through the machine’s interface, of screen and milk 
mechanism, that a visitor gains some awareness of Amme’s internal processes and changes in state. Amme’s rule-
based program is relatively simple in comparison to contemporary practices within AI such as machine learning. 
Machine learning presents a new challenge in the inscrutability of computation, operating at scales that are 
challenging for human comprehension. Artificial neural networks are trained on vast amounts of data9 and their 
ability to categorise or infer as a result of their training occurs over thousands of individual interrelated 
calculations or neurons. Even experts in the field of AI do not have a clear understanding as to how the logic of 
machine learning networks are generated through training, and how such logic unfolds across the many neurons 
of a trained network (Knight 2017). Mark B. N. Hansen (2015) suggests that predictive computational media 
operate within world sensibility, by which he means the world’s ability for self-sensing, at levels that elude direct 
human perception10. These media are able to access, intervene within and make apparent to us, although partially, 
indirectly and retrospectively, data within experience that affects us—including data on the operation on the 
activity of computational media itself, but which we would otherwise be unable to register through our human 
sensory perception. We are then able to take up this otherwise inaccessible information into our future decision-
making and actions (Shaviro 2013). 
Through several conversations with Amme in 2003, poet Ulf Stolterfoht (Stolterfoht 2017) hoped to gain clarity 
on some thoughts he was having on poetics in order to “cobble together a poetological essay from Amme’s answers” 
(ibid: Introduction, para. 4). Amme reliably responds to Stolterfoht’s provocations, yet he realises not long into 
their first conversation that the machine’s “answers arise from very different discourses” (ibid). Amme’s responses 
are “self-reflexive” (ibid), demonstrating the machines own character or constitution, whilst Stolterfoht is trying 
to have a mutual exchange of ideas through which to settle some of his ideas about poetics. Alongside this 
realisation, Stolterfoht also becomes aware that rather than discussing the ideas about poetics that he wishes to 
confirm, Amme performs them within its “idiosyncratic speech” (ibid). With this information he adjusts how he 
engages with Amme, deciding to just go with the flow of conversation. One example of this performance manifests 
in the way in which Amme works in the conversation, pointing to Stolterfoht’s thoughts on the relationship 
between language and the real. Stolterfoht suggests that within Amme’s lexicon and the blocks of text that Amme 
speaks, words do not indexically reference things in the world but operate and are referential within language, or 
Amme’s setup, itself. As the composition of Amme’s statements involves responding to words typed in by the 
visitor, by searching its lexica and constructing a response according to the visitor’s words and the system’s rules. 
In this Stolterfoht perceives that Amme has a complete indifference to human understanding, but a better way to 
                                                                
9  This presents a dramatic shift in the production and operation of computational codes. In traditional 
programming, a pre-determined logic is applied to data, whereas in machine learning the training of masses of 
data through artificial neural networks inscribe logic (cf. Pasquinelli 2017). 
10 As an example, a computational microsensor might be able to register infrared light or magnetic fields that we 
are unable to sense. 
regard this may be that Amme’s sensibility does not correlate with human perception and understanding even if it 
is at the same time it is involved in the affective experience of the visitor through the screen and the milk device. 
Amme exhibits the expressive manipulability of language by a computational machine but also conveys how 
technics are operative at the micro-level of experience or world sensibility beyond how Amme’s human 
conversation partner may come to perceive Amme’s remarks on screen and to form an understanding of those 
remarks in meaningful ways. Moreover, it shows how in the design of machine intelligences that making some 
sensibility of their below-phenomenal operations and difference apparent can feed-forward, to use Hansen’s (2015) 
term, into our subsequent interrelations with them. 
Black Boxes, Critique and Compositionism 
The inscrutability of computation and its influence and activity at micro and macro levels of experience has incited 
calls for ways to understand it and its impact. In response to these calls, algorithmic transparency or opening the 
black box are seen as means to observe and accumulate knowledge of computational systems and further to make 
them accountable (Ananny & Crawford 2016). However, transparency assumes that we can arrive at or perceive 
the truth of a computational system. Bruno Latour views such attempts to arrive at an entities truth by way of 
procedures of unveiling, breaking down, or debunking (all of which he places under the rubric of critique) as 
contingent upon a belief that we can occupy a transcendental viewpoint in relation to an “always already 
assembled” world (Latour 2014: 482). And furthermore, that from this position there are more and less privileged 
ways to know this world from “behind a veil of appearances” (ibid: 475). As an alternative to critique-based 
knowledge making processes, Latour advocates for what he terms a compositionist methodology. Compositionism, 
as defined by Latour, is “all about immanence” (Latour 2014: 475 [original emphasis]) as it does not assume a 
world given, but instead proposes a “common world” composed of a “diverse composite material” (ibid: 474), 
that in its continuity is able to be re-composed, decomposed or built up relation by relation. Mike Ananny and 
Kate Crawford (2017) dispute transparency as a means to truthfully know a system and suggest, as an alternative, 
achievement of contingent and partial knowledge of a system “through relations, not revelations” (ibid: 5). Amme 
functions compositionally to place visitors into relation with an albeit simple machine intelligence not from a 
transcendental viewpoint from which they can truthfully know the system and its inner workings but within the 
complex and messy site of experience where agency is co-composed and proliferates (Latour 2014: 482). In their 
engagement with Amme I suggest that visitors are able to pick up a non-anthropomorphic sensibility of it as a 
machine intelligence, that affirms its agency and contribution to world sensibility as dramatically different or alien 
to their own. 
Critique also operates on the idea that through knowing a computational system it can be improved and that a 
sublime or true system can be achieved through revisions such as a better or larger dataset, longer training of the 
model or a different network structure11. Through analysis of current machine learning research practices, Kiri 
Wagstaff describes how machine learning research progresses through the formulation of problems that become 
functions to be optimised within the field (Wagstaff 2012). Connections between progressions in machine learning 
and the wider world or domains of research in which they are, or could be situated within, are therefore diminished 
                                                                
11 This is not to say that systems should not be improved, merely that they will never achieve perfect functionality. 
as much of machine learning is done for its own sake12. Academic papers on the machine learning technique of 
style transfer—one of the most circulated examples of AI’s potential for creative expression, typify this problem. 
As a function to be optimised, style transfer networks are compared in machine learning papers and communities 
for their capacity to comprehensively translate the stylistic features of one image onto the content of another with 
the least degradation of the latter (Gatys et al 2015, Ying et al 2017). Gatys et al (2015) view the relation between 
a human generated image’s content and style as having a determinable “algorithmic basis” (Gatys et al 2015: 1) 
that can be found and automated through the training of an artificial neural network. Reacting to the difficulty in 
comparing style transfer networks, researchers Ying et al (2017) suggest that an evaluation is possible by running 
a base set of ten style images and ten content images through different style transfer models. Style transfer, in 
research, draws data from the field of art—most often digital photographs of 20th century paintings with distinct 
visual features (e.g. Vincent van Gogh’s Starry Night), but it does not communicate nor operate in relation to the 
current art domain and its discourses, rather it is communicated back into the machine learning community as a 
better implementation of a function. 
Questioning calls for transparency is not to say that we do not need ways of understanding computation and its 
operativity, but that transparency is limited in its scope13 (Ananny & Crawford 2016) and that we need alternative 
avenues through which to understand and relate to machine intelligences other than unveiling their truth, grasping 
towards sublime computational algorithms, or biomorphic normativity and the seemingly seamless social 
interactions with machine intelligences that such semblances can capacitate. Understanding computational 
systems through transparency is limited, as their “significance lies not internally but relationally” (Ananny & 
Craword 2016: 12). Visitors cannot see the internal operations of Amme’s system but are nonetheless brought into 
the mix of a complex relationality of language, code, rules, machine, human, and interfaces. Within this 
relationality, I suggest that Amme generates an estrangement14 upon the human experience of machines. As Amme 
is not a readable machine and does not act as an “engaging friend who feigns affirmation or empathy” (Dittmer 
2017: Chapter 2 para. 13), visitors are forced to relate to Amme anew, without being able to fall into conventional 
ways of relating with machines that mimic human relations. They more slowly develop an idea of Amme’s material 
reality and difference, and how they and the machine can establish an interrelation which leads to the co-
composition of an on-going conversation. As can be seen in Stolterfoht’s account of his attempt to discuss poetics 
with Amme. Mike Annany and Kate Crawford (2016) propose that in order to be able to understand computational 
systems, we need to not see into them but across them as “sociotechnical systems that do not contain complexity 
but enact complexity” (ibid: 2) and that this complexity involves both humans and non-humans co-composing.15 
                                                                
12 As an example, Wagstaff writes that “legions of researchers have chased after the best iris or mushroom 
classifier. Yet the flurry of this effort does not seem to have had any impact on the fields of botany or mycology” 
(Wagstaff 2012: 2). 
13 For a full account of algorithmic transparency and its limitations see Ananny and Crawford 2016. 
14 The use of this term is taken up from critical design. Discussing speculative fictional images, Dunne and Raby 
(2013) state that an image they see as enacting estrangement “gently forces viewers to make sense of what they 
are looking at rather than simply recognising or reading cues” (ibid: 32).   
15  Further artworks that could be discussed in the framework of this short paper include Francis Tseng’s 
Conspiracy Bot (2017), Sarah Meyohas’ Cloud of Petals (2016), Matthew Plummer-Fernandez’ Novice Art 
Blogger (2014), Memo Atken and Alexander Whitley’s Pattern Recognition (2016), Ian Cheng’s Emissaries 
(2017) trilogy and Stephanie Dinkins conversational series with robot BIN48 (Dinkins 2014-ongoing). 
Shinseungback Kimyonghun’s  Animal 
Classifier 
Through his investigation of machine learners—a term used to encompass “humans and machines or human-
machine relations” (Mackenzie 2017: 6), Adrian Mackenzie suggests that one way to trace their “diagrammatic 
composition” is to “partially reconfigure oneself as a machine learner by occupying operational subject positions” 
(ibid: 18), such as that of the programmer or a data scientist. In their work Animal Classifier (2016) Korean 
collective Shinseungback Kimyonghun’s are concerned with how image recognition by deep learning networks16 
comes together as a system of classification. Their work makes the co-composition and casual gaps of image 
classification apparent through their training of an imaginative or absurd classification model. To do this they use 
TensorFlow—an open source machine learning library by Google, and Inception V3—a deep convolutional neural 
network that can be used in TensorFlow for training an image recognition model. The classification model was 
trained on images sourced from Flickr (Shinseungback Kimyonghun 2016). Classification is a common operation 
of AI and deep learning is particularly effective at successfully stating the contents of an image. Classifications 
can work in many different ways, but for Mackenzie (2015), they all rely on the expectation that the world is 
consistent and classifiable, able to be partitioned into distinctive, stable, and differentiable categories. Most 
processes of machine learning classification rely on a dataset that is pre-labelled or classified by humans, which 
is used to train a classification model. After training these classifications are then used to classify new images.  
Animal Classifier (Shinseungback Kimyonghun 2016) is trained to classify animals according to a peculiar 
taxonomy of fourteen categories from a Jorge Luis Borges essay The Analytical Language of John Wilkins (Borges 
1999). The categories from Borges essay are distinctly different to those used in conventional AI, including 
classifications such as “frenzied”, “fabulous ones” or “that from a long way off look like flies” (ibid: 231). These 
absurd categories also perform an estrangement, causing us to question, rather than accept, how the categories 
within the system are formed, and further how the model comes to associate categories with specific images. 
When exhibited as a work, each category is presented as a specimen, as a small LCD screen inside a bell jar that 
flashes the images that meet the classification. In front of the bell jar, a small brass plaque states the name of the 
classification in English and Korean. By undertaking a non-conventional classification process and presenting its 
activities as specimens to be examined, the work offers a study of how deep learning classification comes to know, 
cognise, and act in the world. As an example, the classification for siren presents a series of images of mermaids. 
Siren, as a term, could encapsulate other entities, such as a warning siren or an American amphibian, 
demonstrating that the way in which machine learning classifies, or indeed the way any classification system 
works, is always “arbitrary and speculative” (ibid: 231). Rather than presenting machine learning and its 
classifications as a given, Animal Classifier shows it to be co-constructed within a human and non-human ecology 
that includes various classification methods, the human tagging of training images, and the network’s capacity to 
learn features within digital images that correspond to a tagged classification.  
                                                                
16 To offer a simple definition, deep learning is a variant of machine learning that utilises more neurons and 
multiple layers in its network.  
Concluding Thoughts 
This paper aims to give a brief account of artists working with machine intelligences and offers some preliminary 
thoughts on what their activity might offer as these technologies become increasingly present and articulate within 
the world’s sensibility. Importantly, they disrupt biomorphic and socially normative notions of machine 
intelligences instead drawing attention to how such technologies, even if they are able to operate within our social 
experience and we can converse and relate with them, operate within and experience the world differently to us. 
Processes of computational media and machine intelligence operate at the micro levels of experience, and their 
capacity to access, intervene and make perceptible data within experience that is beneath our sensory awareness 
but otherwise affects us means that it is also able to partially relay its own impacts to us. This points to how in the 
design of our relations with machine intelligences, offering some sensibility as to their non-human operations in 
non-biomorphic or non-socially normative ways can better inform our future decision-making, actions and 
interrelations with them. In these ways, artists enable us to break out of “implicitly or explicitly human-centered 
understandings of machine intelligence” (Goffey 2008: 140). Rather than opening the black box of computational 
technologies, Amme and Animal Classifier offer transversal views of machine intelligences as co-compositional 
systems where we can grasp their “material and ideological realities” (Ananny and Crawford 2016: 2) as 
continuing but re-configurable human and non-human networks. Compositionism for Latour is about creating a 
common world that is “slowly composed instead of being taken for granted and imposed on all” (Latour 2014: 
488). It is in this space of contestation that artists who compose co-compositionally with machines intelligences 
are of great importance and warrant further and deeper investigation, as they can navigate us into new and 
informative relations with them. 
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